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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the tragedies at Columbine, Virginia Tech, and
Northern Illinois University,1 FDA black box warnings on antidepressants for young adults,2 and the Church of Scientology’s public stance
against psychotropic medications,3 children’s mental health is of great
and growing concern to parents, schools, and society at large.4 Although
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1. On the morning of April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School, Eric Harris and
Dylan Klebold, walked onto campus, shot to death twelve fellow students and a teacher, and then
killed themselves. Tina Kelley, In an Era of School Shootings, A New Drill, N.Y. TIMES, March 25,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/nyregion/25drills.html. On April 16, 2007, a student at
the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Seung-Hui Cho, opened fire in a dormitory
and classroom building on campus, killing thirty-two people before committing suicide. Kelley,
supra; Elizabeth Stone, The Expanding Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/education/edlife/mental.html. On February 14, 2008, Stephen
Kazmierczak, a former student at Northern Illinois University, opened fire on students in a lecture
hall, fatally shooting five students and injuring eighteen more, before turning the gun on himself.
Kelley, supra; Stone, supra. All four individuals suffered from mental health problems, including
depression and anger management issues, antisocial personality disorder, extreme social anxiety and
isolative tendencies, and obsessive compulsive disorder, respectively.
2. The Food and Drug Administration ordered drug manufacturers to add warnings (in a black
box displayed on the prescribing information) to antidepressant medications, which inform users that
the drug may increase the risk of suicidal thinking or behavior in some young adults. Benedict Carey, F.D.A. Expands Suicide Warning on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/health/03depress.html.
3. Joel Sappell & Robert W. Welkos, Suits, Protests Fuel a Campaign Against Psychiatry, L.A.
TIMES, June 29, 1990, http://www.latimes.com/la-scientology062990a,0,3292532.story (explaining
Scientologists’ eager campaign against the “problem of psychiatric drugging”).
4. Stone, supra note 1.
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research is improving, relatively little is known about the most effective
strategies for the prevention, detection, diagnosis, and treatment of childhood mental disorders.5
Because factors such as lack of medical knowledge, cultural beliefs,
privacy concerns, and stigmatization shape attitudes toward children’s
mental health, this social issue lacks consensus on not only basic definitions but also effective strategies.6 As a result, states have begun to take
radically different approaches to children’s mental health legislation.7 In
addition to the factors that influence peoples’ attitudes toward children’s
mental health, several core issues complicate the debate on children’s
mental health, including the role of parenting and family values,8 the decision to treat children with pharmaceuticals,9 and the ethics of pediatric
clinical research.10 While these factors and issues guide parents, schools,
and legislators in acknowledging childhood mental illness,11 they should
not take precedence over the best interests of the mentally ill child. If the
intention of all those involved is to protect the best interests of the mentally ill child, the issues that most need to be addressed in this dialogue
are how to prevent and detect children’s mental illness.12
To improve the prevention and detection of childhood mental illness, it is first necessary to consider the systems at work. That is, who is
in the best position to prevent the onset of a child’s mental disorder?13
Who is in the best position to detect if a child suffers from mental illness?14 Few would argue that the two social groups most intimately involved in a child’s life, and therefore in the best positions to prevent and
recognize a child’s mental health issue, are parents and family members

5. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 193 (1999), available
at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html [hereinafter REPORT OF SURGEON
GENERAL]. The Surgeon General’s office created this report on mental health to provide a review of
scientific advances in the study of mental health and of mental illnesses for the public. Id. at 3.
6. Jeffrey Kluger et al., Medicating Young Minds, TIME, Nov. 3, 2003, at 48, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1006034,00.html.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: TREATMENT OF
CHILDREN WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 2 (2000), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/publications/treatment-of-children-with-mentaldisorders/complete.pdf
[hereinafter
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS].
10. Kathleen C. Glass & Ariella Binik, Rethinking Risk in Pediatric Research, 36 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 567, 573 (2008).
11. See infra Part V.
12. Howard S. Adelman & Linda Taylor, Mental Health in Schools and Public Health, 121
PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 294, 296 (May-June 2006).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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and teachers and schools.15 But if both the family unit and the education
system are gatekeepers of a child’s mental health, which system should
be responsible for standing guard? And what is the best way for that system to implement comprehensive prevention and detection measures?
These are the central issues of this Comment. Consensus is polarized on
the issue of the proper respective roles of parents and the public education system in not only offering preventative measures but also detecting
childhood mental illness.16
This Comment explores three states’ approaches to mental health
screenings for earlier identification of impaired mental health functioning
in educational settings. The State of Washington has yet to pass any legislation aimed at instituting a mental health schema within its public
schools. This Comment argues that the Washington legislature should
enact children’s mental health legislation that reflects an integration of
the three state positions.17 Specifically, Washington should adopt a cooperative and transparent mental health scheme for public schools that
includes in-school screening, informed and active parental consent, educator training, and emotional health curriculum because it preserves parental rights while also protecting the well-being of mentally ill children.
Part II of this Comment discusses both the current state of children’s mental health and the concepts of prevention and detection. It
emphasizes the significance of educating teachers, implementing emotional health curricula in public schools, and utilizing mental health
screenings as early detection devices. It also provides a summary of the
current state of children’s mental health law as it relates to Washington’s
public education system. Part III describes the federal government’s attitude toward children’s mental health and reviews federal statutes pertaining to the distribution of school surveys in public schools. Part IV explains the development of the constitutional right to parent and its application to children’s mental health. It also discusses the tension between
parents and schools on privacy issues such as distributing screenings to
students. Part V presents children’s mental health legislation from three
states: Illinois, Utah, and Connecticut. This Part introduces not only the
substance of the various legislative measures but also the radically different positions taken. Part VI recommends that Washington adopt a
cooperative and transparent system that includes in-school screening,
informed and active parental consent, educator training, and emotional
health curricula.
15. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 136.
16. See infra Part V.
17. The three states that will be discussed are Illinois, Utah, and Connecticut. The scope of the
legislation is described further in Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
Before describing the mental health legislation Washington ought
to adopt, it is first necessary to define mental health and mental disorder
and discuss how children are affected when they are labeled by such
terms. This Part also introduces the concepts of prevention and detection
to emphasize the need for holistic legislation and mental health screenings. Finally, this Part concludes with a summary of Washington’s current children’s mental health legislation.
A. The Mentally Ill Child
According to the Surgeon General’s Report on Mental Health, mental health is “a state of successful performance of mental functioning,
resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with other people, and the ability to adapt to change and cope with adversity.”18 Mental
illness, on the other hand, “refers collectively to all of the diagnosable
mental disorders”19 included in the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of
Mental Disorders IV.20 Mental disorders are “health conditions that are
characterized by alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some
combination thereof) associated with distress or impaired functioning.”21
Mental health is perceived along a spectrum stretching from “successful mental functioning” to “impaired functioning.”22 The mental
health spectrum exists for both children and adults.23 In the relatively
recent past, professionals believed that mental disorders such as anxiety
disorders, depression, and bipolar disorder began in adulthood.24 Now,
however, it is well-known that these disorders can begin in childhood.25
It is estimated that ten percent of children and adolescents in the United
States suffer from mental illness severe enough to cause some level of
impairment.26 The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that
fewer than one in five of those children receive treatment.27

18. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 4.
19. Id. at 5.
20. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ADMINISTRATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
21. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 10, at 2. The National Institute of Mental Health
collaborated with the Department of Health and Human Services, the Public Health Service, and the
National Institutes of Health to create this document for the public especially for parents concerned
about doctors prescribing psychotropic medications to their children. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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This startling statistic can be explained by problems with detection.
Because children develop and grow at a rapid pace, it is often difficult
for professionals such as pediatricians, child and adolescent psychiatrists,
therapists, and school personnel to diagnose childhood mental illness.28
For example, some mental health problems are short-lived—such as situational anxiety or depression—and therefore require no treatment.29
Others are persistent and serious—such as autism, bipolar disorder, and
schizophrenia—and necessitate substantial professional treatment.30
Because mental illness affects ten percent of children and adolescents, it is important for states to take positive steps toward enacting legislation addressing this issue. Children’s mental health legislation should
target holistic prevention by means of educator training and introducing
emotional health curricula and early detection by implementing mental
health screenings.
B. Prevention
To effectively address the concerns about children’s mental health,
the Washington legislature must integrate a preventative-education component into the legislation. This prevention component should include
training educators on children’s mental health issues and introducing
emotional health curriculum to students. Public schools stand in a particularly good position to educate children on managing their emotions
and employ preventative measures to help thwart the development of
mental disorders.31 This section focuses on the development of prevention interventions and the factors associated with creating and implementing prevention programs.
Progress in the development of prevention interventions in the field
of mental health has faced several challenges.32 Prevention advancement
has been slow for two reasons: insufficient knowledge of the cause of
mental disorders and inability to alter the known causes of a particular
disorder.33 To improve prevention interventions, researchers have developed prevention programs aimed at reducing risk factors and enhancing
protective factors.34
28. Id.
29. See generally JAMES MORRISON, DSM-IV MADE EASY (The Guilford Press 2001) (1995)
(containing diagnostic criteria and explanatory material regarding all mental health disorders, including disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood, or adolescence).
30. Id.
31. Howard S. Adelman & Linda Taylor, Mental Health in Schools: A Shared Agenda,
EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS IN YOUTH, Summer 2004, at 62.
32. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 62.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 63.
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There are various risk factors associated with prevention programs.
Risk factors are characteristics or hazards that, if present, make it more
likely that a particular child, rather than another child will develop a disorder.35 Examples of risk factors include lack of social support, inability
to read, difficult temperament, and exposure to bullying.36 To reduce a
child’s chances of developing mental illness, researchers focus on decreasing the accumulation of risk factors.37 This strategy changes the
risks that are most easily and quickly amenable to intervention.38 For
example, altering a child’s classroom environment and reinforcing positive academic accomplishments—rather than altering a child’s unstable
and dysfunctional home environment—may minimize disruptive and
isolative behaviors.39
Prevention programs focus not only on risk factors but also on protective factors.40 Protective factors improve an individual’s coping mechanism or adaptive response to an environmental hazard;41 for example,
direct teacher instruction designed to enhance specific areas of knowledge, skills, and attitudes on mental health matters or after-school youth
development programs.42 By enhancing protective factors, researchers
believe that individuals can learn to buffer the negative effects of risk
factors.43
Prevention programs that reduce risk factors and enhance protective
factors are amenable to the school environment. These interventions can
be extremely helpful, are relatively uncontroversial, and are easy to implement. Accordingly, children’s mental health legislation should include a preventative component that educates teachers and school personnel about children’s mental health issues and implements emotional
health curricula. Student curricula should focus on themes such as anger
management, conflict resolution skills, and relaxation techniques. Partnering this preventative component with a detection component will enable educators to institute programs that focus on the source of childhood
mental illness.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 64.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 63.
41. Id.
42. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 296.
43. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 64.
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C. Detection
Detecting a child’s mental illness is just as important as preventing
it.44 This section discusses the process of detecting mental illness and
includes a specific introduction to mental health screening instruments.
Generally speaking, successful treatment of children with mental
disorders is a result of the following process: detection of a potential
mental health problem, comprehensive assessment and evaluation, diagnosis, recommendation for target intervention, and treatment.45 Researchers have introduced the concept of screening—also called prescreening or first-level screening—as a tool for detecting potential mental health problems.46 While screenings do not produce a diagnosis, they
are used as an instrument by a variety of individuals, including pediatricians, nurses, school personnel, and therapists, to identify the types of
mental health disorders that may cause a child’s emotional or behavioral
difficulties.47
A mental health screening is usually a brief, culturally sensitive instrument designed to identify children and adolescents who may be at
risk of impaired mental health functioning and who may therefore require immediate attention, a diagnostic assessment referral, or intervention.48 The primary purpose of a screening is to recognize, using a valid,
reliable mental health instrument, a need for further assessment of a
child.49 The screening instrument is typically one to two pages long, rapidly administered, and easy to understand (i.e., no complex terminology).50 The screening instrument usually includes questions regarding
childhood and family background and any family history of mental
health problems.51 The goal of mental health screenings is to enhance
detection and, ultimately, to prevent the ultimate exacerbation of a mental health problem.52
Although mental health screenings are important for early detection
of mental illness, these screening instruments have four major limitations. First, social constructions of mental disorders vary from culture to
44. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 296.
45. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 136–39.
46. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 296.
47. REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 5, at 138.
48. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS AMONG
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2004), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/204956.pdf [hereinafter SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH].
49. Howard S. Adelman & Linda Taylor, Mental Health in Schools and System Restructuring,
19 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 137, 142 (1999).
50. See generally SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 48, at 2.
51. Id. at 2–12.
52. Id.
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culture, and mental health screening instruments might not successfully
address inherent language or cultural bias.53 Second, because the administrator of the test reviews and interprets some of the screening instruments’ results, the outcome of those results may be impacted or skewed
by potential subjectivity.54 Third, it is imperative that screening instruments are age appropriate and that administrators consider the cognitive
level of the student being tested.55 Fourth, some mental health screening
instruments lack evidence of psychometric reliability.56
While there are drawbacks to mental health screenings, most diagnostic instruments contain inherent biases.57 Relatively minor problems
with reliability and validity, while notable, are not critical, considering
the purpose of these instruments is to promote early detection of possible
mental health issues, not to diagnose a child with a mental health disorder. Currently, the two laws Washington has enacted regarding children’s mental health do not require schools to use mental health screenings.
D. The Current State of Children’s Mental Health Law in Washington
Although Washington has yet to take any explicit steps to improve
children’s mental health in the public school system, there have been
some initial steps in the right direction. This section discusses the Mental Health Transformation Project and introduces two state statutes regarding the children’s mental health system in Washington.
In October 2005, Washington was awarded a Mental Health Transformation State Incentive Grant.58 The grant created the Washington
Mental Health Transformation Project and called for a focus on systemwide reform.59 The conditions of the grant require specific focus on the
areas of planning and implementation, community organization activities, research and evaluation, and recommendations for change in service
delivery.60
The Mental Health Transformation Project submitted Plan Phase I
in 2006, which included an entire chapter devoted to prevention and ear-

53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 11.
58. Washington’s Mental Health Transformation Project: Partnerships for Recovery and Resiliency, The Project, http://mhtransformation.wa.gov/MHTG/project.shtml (last visited July 2009).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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ly intervention.61 The plan stated that “while excellent work occurs
in . . . education programs, issues around screening and early intervention for children in public schools remains a challenge.”62 It called for a
system of “coordinated school health” in Washington.63
David Brenna, former Senior Policy Analyst for the Transformation
Project, believes that mental health screening instruments could affect
teachers’ responses to social and emotional development in the classroom.64 Brenna recognizes that the challenge for teachers is that they are
unfamiliar with mental health services.65 Therefore, Brenna advocates
that Washington should engage teachers with “sets of tools to better understand children who present challenges in the learning environment.”66
He believes that educating children and teachers about social and emotional barriers to learning not only helps teachers do their job but also
helps identify children with emotional issues.67 Thus, Brenna argues
prevention through teacher education and social and developmental standards is a great approach to transforming Washington children’s mental
health.68 This is the direction that the Transformation Project is now
headed.69
While Washington has begun to take introductory steps to address
children’s mental health through grant incentives such as the Mental
Health Transformation Project, it has yet to implement any legislation
aimed to improve children’s mental health in coordination with the public education system. However, there are two statutes in particular worth
mentioning.
First, the Community Mental Health Services Act was enacted with
the intent to establish a community mental health program that provides
access to mental health services for both adults and children who are
acutely mentally ill or severely emotionally disturbed.70 The statute’s
purpose is to promote earlier identification of mentally ill children and to
ensure that children receive treatment appropriate for their developmen-

61. WASHINGTON STATE’S MENTAL HEALTH TRANSFORMATION PROJECT, 2006 WASHINGTON
MENTAL HEALTH TRANSFORMATION PLAN: PHASE I 122-30 (Sep. 30, 2006), available at
http://mhtransformation.wa.gov/pdf/mhtg/CMHP_Ch4.pdf.
62. Id. at 125.
63. Id. at 126.
64. Telephone Interview with David Brenna, Senior Policy Analyst, Mental Health Transformation Project, in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 21, 2008).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.24.015(1) (2009).
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tal level.71 The statute also provides for coordination of services between
the Department of Health and Human Services, the office of the superintendent of public instruction, mental hospitals, county authorities, and
other support services, including the families of mentally ill individuals,72 as well as creates regional support network programs to facilitate
the delivery of those services.73 Although the Community Mental Health
Services Act recognizes the importance of and need for children’s mental
health services, it does not incorporate the public education system in its
efforts to prevent and detect childhood mental illness.
The second statute, Coordination of Children’s Mental Health Services, was created to implement an improved system of children’s mental
health services in Washington.74 The statute’s goal is to promote early
identification, intervention, and prevention; coordinate existing mental
health programs; and integrate educational support services to address
students’ diverse learning styles.75 Additionally, the statute recognizes
that such a system should provide a continuum of services, equity in access to services, and qualified mental health providers.76 However, the
statute’s purpose—to improve the efficacy of the current system—does
not integrate the public education system.
In sum, to successfully curb the prevalence of mental health disorders in children, legislators should afford special attention to the concepts of prevention and detection. The Washington legislature should
incorporate not only a curriculum and educator training component into
children’s mental health laws but also a mental health screening component to help effectuate the detection of possible mental health problems.
While Washington statutes do recognize the need for children’s mental
health services and are striving to improve those existing services, there
is no current legislation addressing the issue at hand. As discussed in the
next Part, the federal government recognizes the importance of public
school involvement in children’s mental health, including early detection
through mental health screenings.
III. FEDERAL CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH LAW
While schools may not be in the business of mental health, the public education system must address children’s mental health concerns if
schools are to serve their function of teaching students and promoting
71. Id.
72. Id. § 71.24.015(6).
73. Id. § 71.24.016 (2009).
74. Id. § 71.36.005 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 71.36.025 (2009).
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their success.77 Even though schools may not be responsible for meeting
every need of each student, they must address those needs that directly
affect learning.78
This Part discusses federal initiatives and statutes that aim to improve mental health systems in schools and regulate the distribution of
school surveys—which could potentially include mental health screenings. These initiatives and statutes include: (1) the President’s New
Freedom Commission on Mental Health, (2) the Protection of Pupil
Rights Act and the No Child Left Behind Act, and (3) the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. It is especially important for Washington to consider federal laws that regulate the administration of surveys
because these statutes dictate the requisite structure of state mental health
schemes. Of particular importance are the federal statutes that regulate
parental consent because consent plays a large role in the constitutionality of mental health screenings, discussed in Part IV.
A. The President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health
The federal government supports improving the children’s mental
health system. In 2002, by Executive Order, President George W. Bush
created the President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health
(“the Commission”).79 The Commission was to, among other things,
“recommend improvements that allow . . . children with serious emotional disturbance to live, work, learn, and participate fully in their communities.”80
In 2003, the Commission released a critical report addressing the
problem of fragmented health care in the United States.81 Because access to mental health care is scattered in this country, families are often
responsible for coordinating their own support and services.82 Naturally,
the search for care usually occurs at a time of crisis; when the family’s
ability to realize this responsibility is most compromised.83 While multiple programs, regulated by various federal agencies are involved in the
field of mental health, most care is managed by states and localities.84
77. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 31, at 59.
78. Id.
79. Exec. Order No. 13,263, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,337 (Apr. 29, 2002).
80. Id.
81. THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (2003), available at
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/downloads/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION].
82. Michael F. Hogan, Introduction to THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra
note 81, at 1.
83. PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra note 82, at 8.
84. Id.
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Furthermore, these various programs are governed by different statutes,
shaped by diverse congressional committees, and defended by multiple
constituencies.85 Consequently, the political dynamics between these
layers of government tend to frustrate comprehensive reform of the system.86
To implement comprehensive reform, the report recommends “fundamentally transforming how mental health care is delivered in the United States.”87 The report proposes six goals for achieving transformation,
including (1) “Americans Understand that Mental Health is Essential to
Overall Health;” (2) “Mental Health Care is Consumer and Family Driven;” and (3) “Early Mental Health Screening, Assessment and Referral
to Services Are Common Practice.”88
Most important for the purposes of this Comment is the third
goal—”Early mental health screening[s] . . . are common practice.”89
The third goal specifically recommends that the government improve and
expand school mental health programs.90 The report recognizes that
many problems associated with the current mental health system result
from late diagnosis and lack of participation in care.91 To address this
problem, the report recommends a stronger focus on early childhood
mental health and endorses the aforementioned concept of preventative
interventions.92 The report suggests that the government should re-think
how school systems can more efficiently partner with and use state and
federal funds to support school-based mental health services.93 Of particular importance, the report states that “[s]chools are in a key position
to identify mental health problems early and to provide a link to appropriate services.”94 Thus, the Commission’s report robustly supports the
notion that states should enact mental health legislation to include mental
health screenings in public schools.
B. The Protection of Pupil Rights Act and the No Child Left Behind Act
In addition to the New Freedom Commission, the federal government has also enacted statutes that affect state mental health schemes.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The other three goals include (4) “Disparities in Mental Health
Services are Eliminated;” (5) “Excellent Mental Health Care is Delivered and Research is Accelerated;” and (6) “Technology is Used to Access Mental Health Care and Information.” Id.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 53.
94. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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The Protection of Pupil Rights Act (PPRA) was enacted in 1974.95 The
PPRA protects student privacy and regulates parental consent to public
school administration of surveys and evaluations.96 In 2002, the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) expanded the PPRA.97
The PPRA now requires schools to allow parents to inspect surveys
and evaluations.98 The statute dictates that no student shall be required to
submit to a survey that reveals personal information, including “mental
or psychological problems of the student or the student’s family.”99 The
school must also notify parents of upcoming surveys and offer an opportunity for the parent to opt the student out of participation in a survey that
collects personal information.100
In sum, the PPRA requires schools to inform parents of sensitive
surveys and allow parents to rebut assumed consent.101 Thus the statute
models passive parental consent. Understanding the relationship between mental health screenings and surveys in the context of the PPRA is
important because parental consent, as discussed infra in Part IV.B, is a
sensitive topic in diagnosing childhood mental illness. Thus, the issue of
importance is whether mental health screenings constitute surveys under
the PPRA.
The PPRA statute does not define “survey,” but it states that surveys include evaluations, and it refers to “survey, analysis, or evaluation”
several times.102 Technically speaking, screening instruments are only
indicator tools, not evaluative tools. Thus, the purpose of a mental health
screening is not to assess, analyze, or evaluate but to refer children with
potential mental health issues for evaluation.103 Nevertheless, most individuals would agree that mental health screenings could easily be classified as sensitive surveys. To be safe, schools planning on administering
mental health screenings should comply with the PPRA passive consent
model.
Although passive parental consent is the floor, the Washington legislature should heighten that standard to require informed and active parental consent to mental health screenings. Washington’s legislation
should therefore include provisions that require public schools to provide
95. Protection of Pupil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (2002).
96. Id.
97. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110 § 1061, 115 Stat. 1425, 2083 (2002).
98. Protection of Pupil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232h(c)(1)(A)−(B) (2002).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 1232h(c)(2).
101. See generally Lynn M. Daggett, Student Privacy and the Protection of Pupil Rights Act as
Amended by No Child Left Behind, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 51 (2008).
102. Protection of Pupil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (2002).
103. SCREENING AND ASSESSING MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 48, at 2.
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parents with advanced notice of screenings and active consent forms.
Active parental consent not only explicitly notifies parents that students,
with their permission, are going to be asked to divulge sensitive information but also offers comfort to those concerned with student privacy.
Thus, to avoid ambiguity under the PPRA, Washington should explicitly
require informed and active parental consent as part of its children’s
mental health legislation.
C. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In addition to the PPRA and the NCLB, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), reauthorized in 2004 under the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act, includes an important implication
for teachers, parents, and children with regard to childhood mental illness.104 An amendment to IDEA, entitled “Prohibition on Mandatory
Medication,” bans “state and local educational personnel from requiring
a child to obtain a prescription . . . as a condition of attending school
[or] . . . receiving an evaluation.”105 Because teachers were concerned
with potential communication barriers, the legislature included a provision explicitly allowing teachers to share classroom-based observations
with parents.106 This language is particularly important because it encourages collaboration and transparency between parents and public
schools vis-à-vis children’s mental health. Mental screening legislation
should reinforce open communication between families and education
systems when it concerns a child’s mental well-being.
While the President’s New Freedom Commission, the PPRA, and
the IDEA do not explicitly address regulations regarding the distribution
of mental health screenings in public schools, each plays an important
role. The federal government clearly recognizes the need for early mental health screenings as evidenced by the goals of the Commission’s report. The PPRA and the NCLB regulate parental consent to sensitive
school surveys and model passive parental consent, and the IDEA plainly
encourages full and frank communication between teachers and parents
regarding children’s behavioral health. While the federal statutes address
formalistic concerns with enacting a mental health scheme in Washington, case law, particularly Supreme Court precedent, tackles the normative concerns with mental health screening legislation, specifically in
relation to family privacy and the fundamental right to parent.

104. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-779 § 25, 118
Stat. 2647 (2004).
105. Id. § 25, 118 Stat. at 2691.
106. Id.
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IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARENT
Because Washington should adopt a transparent mental health
scheme for public schools that implements routine in-school screenings,
it is essential that the legislature address issues surrounding privacy and
parental rights. Mental health screenings concern very private and personal matters, and traditionally, children’s mental health issues have
been kept inside the family circle. Thus, mental health screening legislation naturally raises questions relating to privacy, constitutionality, and
infringement of the fundamental right to parent.107
Despite their personal and sensitive content, mental health screenings are not typically conducted in private and are generally administered
by individuals who are not family members. As a result, public schools
have access to personal data that is usually privy to a child’s parents and
family members. Do mental health screenings blur the line between privacy, the fundamental right to parent, and the best interests of the child?
Constitutional debates regarding mental health screenings primarily arise
out of Supreme Court holdings and other courts’ subsequent interpretations.
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Fundamental Right to
Parent
Because mental health screenings concern information of an intimately private nature, mental health legislation must acknowledge the
nebulous line between constitutional and unconstitutional infringements
on the fundamental right to parent. The broader question of constitutional concern in the area of mental health is whether individuals are entitled to have mental health problems without the government stepping in
and doing something about it. However, the question addressed in this
Comment is narrower: is the fundamental right to parent infringed upon
by the implementation of widespread mental health screenings in public
schools? To answer this question, it is first necessary to understand the
constitutional foundation for the fundamental right to parent.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution dictates that
no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”108 The Supreme Court has found that, under this
guarantee, certain individual rights are so fundamental that the government must justify its interference by proving that its action is necessary

107. Katherine McKeon Curran, Mental Health Screening in Schools: An Analysis of Recent
Legislative Developments and the Legal Implications for Parents, Children, and the State, 11
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 87, 115−19 (2008).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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to achieve a compelling government purpose.109 Recognized fundamental rights include: the right to marry,110 the right to procreate,111 the right
to abortion,112 and the right to control the upbringing of one’s children.113
While none of these rights are specifically enumerated in the Constitution, the Court has held that liberty should be construed to include these
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process analysis.114
The first Supreme Court cases recognizing constitutional protection
for family autonomy involved the rights of parents to control the upbringing of their children.115 In 1923, the Supreme Court, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, declared a state law prohibiting public schools from teaching
in any language other than English unconstitutional.116 The Court invalidated the law under a substantive due process analysis and held that the
statute violated the rights of parents to make decisions regarding their
children.117 Justice McReynolds noted, “Corresponding to the right of
control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life.”118
Just two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held a
state law requiring children to attend public schools unconstitutional.119
The Court stated, “The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for his additional obligations.”120
With these two cases, the Supreme Court established the fundamental
liberty of parents and guardians to control the upbringing and education
of their children.121
However, the Court has also recognized parents’ right to make decisions and to control the upbringing of their child is not absolute and

109. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 809 (3rd ed.
2006).
110. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
111. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541(1990).
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
113. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
114. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
115. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 809.
116. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402−03; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 809.
117. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 809.
118. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
119. Pierce v Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
109, at 809.
120. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 809.
121. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109,
at 809.
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can be interfered with by the state if it is necessary to protect a child.122
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld the application of child labor laws to a nine-year-old girl who had distributed religious literature at
the direction of her parents.123 While the Court acknowledged that there
is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” it also
stated that the “family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest” and that “[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many
other ways.”124
Since the initial recognition of the fundamental right to parent, the
Supreme Court has given great deference to parents when weighing parents’ and states’ competing claims on behalf of children.125 In Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Amish parents had a constitutional
right, based on their fundamental rights to parent and to freely exercise
their religion, to excuse their children from a compulsory school attendance law.126 The Court noted that under the Meyer v Nebraska doctrine,
the compulsory school attendance law interfered with “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”127
The Court has also granted substantial deference to parents in the
context of children’s mental health.128 In Parham v. J.R., the Court was
presented with the issue of what type of due process must be provided to
children when their parents commit them to a mental institution.129 The
Court stated that before a child can be institutionalized by a parent, the
child must be screened by either a doctor or other neutral fact-finder.130
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that while the fact
“[t]hat some parents ‘may at times be acting against the interest of their
children’ . . . creates a basis for caution,” “[t]he statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because
some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradi-

122. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at
809.
123. Prince, 321 U.S.at 166−171; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 809.
124. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added).
125. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at
810.
126. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 810.
127. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232−33; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 810.
128. Parham v J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
129. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 811.
130. Parham, 442 U.S. at 618; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 811.
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tion.”131 Both Parham and Yoder reflect the extent of the Court’s eagerness to defer to parental decision-making.132
While the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed and recognized
that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising and controlling
the upbringing of their children,133 it has also acknowledged that in certain situations, such as protecting children from economic exploitation, a
parent’s interest yields to the state’s interest in protecting the child.134
Because the Court has not established a bright-line rule for determining
when a state has impermissibly intruded on the fundamental right to parent, the Court’s involvement in parental rights cases has increased in the
wake of recent controversies including mandatory contraception distribution programs,135 sex education classes in public schools,136 and comprehensive mental health screening programs.137
B. Other Courts’ Interpretations of the Fundamental Right to Parent
Because the Supreme Court has not articulated a bright-line rule for
ascertaining when a state has impermissibly intruded on the fundamental
right to parent, this section explores the approaches that other courts have
taken with respect to state public school action, such as distribution of
school surveys. These cases help determine whether mental health
screenings in public schools violate the constitutional right to parent.
Circuit courts strictly construe actionable violations of the familial
privacy right to include only those instances where a state official’s action is aimed directly at the parent-child relationship.138 For example, in
Gruenke v. Seip, the Third Circuit held that a school precluding parents
131. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602−03 (quoting Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047−1048
(E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 119 (1977)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 811.
132. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
109, at 810–11.
133. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205; Pierce v Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923).
134. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 158 (1944).
135. See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261−62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding
that such programs infringe on the fundamental right to parent and educate their children as they see
fit); but see Curtis v. School Committee, 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995) (holding that a condom
distribution program did not violate the fundamental right to parent).
136. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995).
137. See infra Part V.
138. Robert Kubica, Let’s Talk About Sex: School Surveys and Parents’ Fundamental Right to
Make Decisions Concerning the Upbringing of Their Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2006)
(citing Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 8−9 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that police did not violate a family’s right to privacy when telling children that they would never see their arrested family member
and not letting the children kiss the family member goodbye); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817,
825 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the liberty interest in family privacy was deprived when children
were not returned to their mother)).
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from making vital decisions concerning their children violated the parents’ constitutional right to parent.139
When a school coach forced a student to take a pregnancy test, the
girl’s parents filed suit against the coach for violating their constitutional
right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their child.140 Because the situation was forced and entirely concentrated on an intensely
personal issue, the Third Circuit found that this case “present[ed] . . . another example of the arrogation of the parental role by a
school.”141 Notably, the court stated that “[s]chool-sponsored counseling
and psychological testing that pry into private family activities can overstep the boundaries of school authority and impermissibly usurp the fundamental right of parents to bring up their children, as they are guaranteed by the Constitution.”142 Thus, the court articulated a distinction between those school actions that are directly aimed at parental decisionmaking authority and those that simply affect the making of parental decisions.143 This distinction will be important to take into consideration
when weighing whether public schools, specifically Washington public
schools, should implement mental health screening programs.
Other courts have been willing to uphold school action as constitutional if information was gathered from students on a voluntary basis and
for a community purpose.144 In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,
the district court considered the constitutionality of a questionnaire administered to middle and high school students that posed highly personal
questions, the results of which were to be collectively used to develop
community programs.145 Before the questionnaire was administered,
parents were notified about the nature of the survey and were given an
opportunity to assess the questionnaire.146 Nevertheless, parents brought
suit against the school, claiming that the survey was not anonymous and
was involuntarily administered.147 The court rejected these arguments
139. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing the distinction between
actions that strike at the heart of parental decision-making authority and those that merely complicate making and implementing parental decisions).
140. Id. at 295−297.
141. Id. at 306.
142. Id. at 307.
143. Id. at 306.
144. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 319 F. Supp. 2d 483 (D.N.J. 2004); see also Fields v.
Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005) (establishing parents’ decision-making right
lessens once a parent has chosen to enroll their child in public school rather than choosing private or
home schooling).
145. Jennifer H. Gelman, Brave New School: A Constitutional Argument Against StateMandated Mental Health Assessments in Public Schools, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 213, 233 (2006)
(citing Ridgewood, 319 F. Supp. at 483).
146. Ridgewood, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
147. Id. at 496.
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and suggested that the parents should have inferred from the school mailings that the nature of the questionnaire was personal and that failure to
respond constituted implicit consent.148 And while the court agreed that
it was reasonable to infer that the survey was involuntary, it held that a
“voluntary, anonymous survey with notice of opt-out possibilities to parents” does not constitute an intrusion into the constitutionally-protected
fundamental right to parent without governmental interference.149
Thus, in C.N., the notice and opt-out provisions were instrumental
in finding the school action constitutional.150 This case provides a particularly usefully analysis regarding school surveys that collect sensitive
personal information, which will be utilized in Part VI to determine the
type of mental health screening Washington should enact.
In Fields v. Palmdale School District, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of controversial school surveys.151 In that case, parents
had given permission for their elementary school students to take part in
a district survey regarding psychological barriers to learning.152 After the
survey was distributed, parents learned that several of the survey questions were related to sexual topics.153 Parental-rights proponents claimed
that the explicit nature of the questions violated their fundamental right
to introduce their children to sexual matters as they see fit—without interference from the state.154 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of the case, holding that a parent’s right to control a
child’s education does not encompass the right to control the flow of information in public schools.155 The court stated that the survey questions
were allowed because they were rationally related to the school board’s
legitimate interest in the effective education and mental welfare of its
students.156
While parents legally remain the sole decision-makers for their
children, the fundamental right to parent is neither absolute nor unqualified. Although the Third Circuit held, in Gruenke, that school action
aimed directly at the parent-child relationship was unconstitutional, cases
like Ridgewood and Fields exemplify the judicial trend of shifting parental authority over to schools. This trend is most applicable when the
148. Id. at 498.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
152. Id. at 1200.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1206.
156. Id. at 1210 (holding that the state’s broad interest was justified under the doctrine of parens patriae).
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school provides notice, makes participation voluntary, and has a legitimate interest, such as protecting students’ mental welfare. Because the
Supreme Court has not provided a bright-line rule as to when school actions infringe upon the fundamental right to parent, these factors are important to consider in light of states’ diverse approaches to children’s
mental health legislation.
V. STATE APPROACHES TO CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION
As the Washington legislature considers legislation requiring mental health screenings in public schools, it is important to review similar
legislation adopted by other states. Illinois has adopted a broad approach
that emphasizes comprehensive children’s mental health reform and
widespread mental screenings.157 Utah has adopted a narrow approach
which emphasizes privacy and limitations on parent–teacher communication.158 Connecticut has adopted a more moderate approach that emphasizes cooperative and transparent school mental health programs.159 This
Part describes these three approaches in consideration of what children’s
mental health legislation Washington should enact.
A. Illinois: The Broad Approach
Of the three state approaches described, Illinois has the most comprehensive children’s mental health legislation. Illinois implemented the
Children’s Mental Health Act in 2003. This statute provides comprehensive and wide-ranging goals for Illinois’s Children’s Mental Health Plan,
including
(2) Guidelines for incorporating social and emotional development
into school learning standards and educational programs . . .; (4)
Recommendations regarding a State budget for children’s mental
health prevention, early intervention, and treatment across all State
agencies . . .; (8) Recommendations for a comprehensive, multifaceted public awareness campaign to reduce the stigma of mental
illness and educate families . . . about the benefits of children’s . . . development . . .; [and] (9) Recommendations for creating a quality-driven children’s mental health system . . . that conducts ongoing needs assessments . . . .160

In regards to the relationship between mental health and the public
school system, the Illinois statute states that
157. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5 (2007).
158. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-605 (2007).
159. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76w (1993).
160. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5(a) (2007).

276

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:255

(a) The Illinois State Board of Education shall develop and implement a plan to incorporate social and emotional development standards as part of the Illinois Learning Standards . . . [and] (b) Every
Illinois school district shall develop a policy for incorporating social
and emotional development into the district’s educational program . . . [that] shall address teaching and assessing social and emotional skills and protocols for responding to children with social,
emotional, or mental health problems . . . that impact learning ability.161

There are three key parts to this statute. First, it requires the state of
Illinois to develop a multi-faceted, strategic system to address prevention
and early intervention of children’s mental illness.162 Second, it directs
the Illinois Board of Education to incorporate social and emotional development standards into state learning standards.163 Finally, it addresses
the assessment of children’s social, emotional, and mental health problems.164 Read altogether, the Illinois statute suggests that Illinois school
districts must develop an all-encompassing mental health program for its
students; one that not only implements curriculum standards but also encourages proactive identification of students with social and emotional
problems.165 Thus, the statute calls for the implementation of mental
health screenings in all public schools.166
In addition to recognizing the need for mental health screening programs, there are three other positive aspects of the statute: (1) it focuses
on the best interests of the child; (2) it emphasizes destigmatization; and
(3) it recognizes a school’s unique position in identifying children’s mental health issues.
First, while the statute affords schools, and therefore the state, considerable authority, it also offers comprehensive, unreserved attention to
the best interests of the child. For example, the statute “recommend[s] . . . [that] key State agencies and programs conduct ongoing
needs assessments,”167 and it directs the Illinois Board of Education to
“develop a policy . . . [that] address[es] . . . social and emotional skills
and protocols for responding to children with social, emotional, or mental health problems.”168 These clauses ordain the state with considerable
power, which may infringe upon the fundamental right to parent. The
161. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15 (2003).
162. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5(a)(3) (2007).
163. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15(a) (2003).
164. Id. 49/15(b).
165. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5; 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15.
166. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5; 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15.
167. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5(a)(9).
168. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15(b) (2003).
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thrust of the statute, however, spotlights the overall healthy social and
emotional development of children and underscores the public benefit of
doing so. Accordingly, the statute strives to “develop a Children’s Mental Health Plan containing short-term and long-term recommendations to
provide comprehensive, coordinated mental health prevention, early intervention, and treatment services for children from birth through age
18.”169 It also recommends a “comprehensive, multi-faceted public
awareness campaign.”170 This enthusiastic attitude toward active prevention and detection of mental illness gets to the heart of the issue and provides a more progressive approach than other states.171
Second, the Illinois statute explicitly requires a “campaign to reduce the stigma of mental illness.”172 As mentioned supra in Part III.A,
one of the main goals of the President’s New Freedom Commission is to
implement marketing campaigns that focus on destigmatization. Illinois’s statutory mandate for a campaign to reduce the stigma of mental
illness encourages active dialogue regarding children’s mental health and
is consistent with the goals of federal legislation.173
Third, the Illinois statute recognizes that schools are in a key position to identify mental health problems early and to provide appropriate
services or links to services. The statute incorporates guidelines into
school learning standards, implores school districts to “develop a policy
for incorporating social and emotional development into the district’s
educational program,” and addresses protocols for responding to children
with mental health problems.174 By realizing that educators stand in a
unique position—both as experts in children’s behavior and as individuals who spend large amounts of time with students, the statute compels
teachers to play a key role in detecting mental illness.175
The Illinois statute’s three strong emphases—the best interests of
the child, destigmatization of mental illness, and involvement of the education community in the detection of mental illness—could potentially
serve as the building blocks for Washington’s children’s mental health
legislation. There are, however, two worrisome aspects of the Illinois
statute. First, the statute favors school authority and, consequently, sub-

169. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5(a) (2007).
170. Id. 49/5(a)(8).
171. See infra Part V.B.
172. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5(a)(8).
173. See infra Part III.A.
174. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15(b) (2003).
175. See generally Jessica Fu, The Researcher’s Second Laboratory: Protecting Our Children
from Social Surveys in Public Schools in Light of Fields v. Palmdale School District, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 589 (2007).
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stantial state power.176 And second, the statute does not address whether
this legislation mandates mental health screenings for all children in the
public school system, regardless of parental consent;177 there are no notice, consent, or opt-out provisions in the statute.178 Because the statute
favors state involvement in children’s mental illness and is unclear on the
parental consent process, this statute might face serious constitutional
challenges.
In considering whether the Illinois statute infringes on the fundamental right to parent, courts will likely examine the validity of the
state’s interest in guarding the general well-being of children.179 While
protecting children’s mental health is of great importance, there is no
case law on point.180 As a result, it is unclear how the court would rule
on this issue. However, in comparison to the C.N. case, where the court
held that a school survey was constitutional because there was parental
notice and an opt-out provision, the Illinois statute’s ambiguousness
might weigh against constitutionality. Thus, in drafting Washington’s
mental health legislation, care should be taken to avoid ambiguity regarding parental notice and consent provisions.
B. Utah: The Narrow Approach
Utah takes a much narrower approach than Illinois. Utah does not
have a specific statute like Illinois, but in 2007, Utah enacted the Medication Recommendations for Children Act, which pertains specifically to
children’s mental health.181 The Utah statute places specific restrictions
on school personnel, which is defined to include all school district employees.182 Section two of the statute states that school personnel may
provide information and observations to a student’s parent or guardian about that student, including observations and concerns in the
following areas: . . . (ii) health and wellness; (iii) social interactions;
[and] (iv) behavior . . . [and] refer students to other appropriate
school personnel . . . including referrals and communication with a
school counselor or other mental health professionals working within the school system.183

176. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/5(a)(9).
177. Id. 49/5.
178. Id.
179. See supra Part IV.A.
180. See supra Part IV.
181. Curran, supra note 107, at 111; UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-605 (2007).
182. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-605(1)(b).
183. Id. § 53A-11-605(2) (emphasis added).
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Section four, however, explicitly addresses the actions that school
personnel may not take. Specifically, school personnel may not
(a) recommend . . . that a child take . . . a psychotropic medication;
(b) require that a student take . . . a psychotropic medication as a
condition for attending school; (c) recommend that a parent . . . seek
or use a type of psychiatric or psychological treatment for a child;
[or] (d) conduct a psychiatric or behavioral health evaluation or
mental health screening, test, evaluation, or assessment of a
child.184

The statute then states that a school counselor or other mental health professional may “(a) recommend, but not require, a psychiatric or behavioral health evaluation of a child; (b) recommend, but not require, psychiatric, psychological, or behavioral treatment for a child; [and] (c) conduct a psychiatric or behavioral health evaluation or mental health
screening, test, evaluation, or assessment of a child.”185
The Utah statutory language opposes mental health screenings. The
law places severe communication restrictions on teachers and school
administrators. For example, although teachers may discuss observations
regarding health, social wellness, and behavior with parents,186 they may
not recommend psychotropic medication187 or recommend that a parent
seek psychological treatment for a child.188 Each teacher, however, retains the right to communicate with a school counselor or mental health
professional, who may then recommend, but not require, a behavioral
health evaluation189 or conduct a mental health screening.190 Thus, the
most restrictive aspect of the statute is its attempt to place clear boundaries on parent–teacher communication regarding a student’s mental
health.
Specifically, the Utah statute places a strong emphasis on (1) family
privacy, (2) the social construction of emotional health, and (3) destigmatization. First, Utah’s Medication Recommendations for Children Act
favors generous parental rights and family autonomy. While the statute
does not ban mental health screenings, it significantly curtails liberal implementation of the tool. Thus, by logical inference, the Utah statute recognizes parents’ countervailing interest against the state’s interest in

184. Id. § 53A-11-605(4) (emphasis added).
185. Id. § 53A-11-605(6) (emphasis added).
186. Id. § 53A-11-605(2).
187. Id. § 53A-11-605(4)(a).
188. Id. § 53A-11-605(4)(c).
189. Id. § 53A-11-605(6)(a).
190. Id. § 53A-11-605(6)(c).
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making private and personal determinations on how much information
the family would like to share with a school.191
Second, because the Utah statute skirts away from parent–teacher
communication regarding mental health and psychotropic medications,
there may be some hesitation regarding the social construction of emotional health. Unlike the stable and universally accepted standards for
routine in-school vision, hearing, or physical health examinations, standards for what constitute emotional health are ever-changing and of considerable debate.192 For example, the most dramatic example of what
constitutes “good emotional health” concerns the construction of homosexuality.193 While 30 years ago, the American Psychiatric Association
included homosexuality as a category of mental illness, the Association
no longer views homosexuality as a pathology.194 Moreover, it is likely
that there are contemporary notions of emotional disturbance held by the
majority that, in the eyes of some parents, are well within the continuum
of emotional health.195 Because Utah’s statute deemphasizes active dialogue regarding children’s mental health, perhaps it has chosen to support parents’ rights to subscribe to a definition of mental health that best
suits their cultural and religious conceptions of emotional well-being.196
Third, the Utah statute reflects concern with stigmatization. Because the statute places such strict limitations on parent–teacher communication and on psychological assessments of students, the state is likely
concerned with the unnecessary stigmatization of children. Children are
an inherently vulnerable population, and mental health is undoubtedly a
highly personal topic.197 The stigma attached to the possibility, or even
the mere intimation, of mental illness may be reason enough for parents
to prefer to deal with their child’s emotional health without school involvement.198 The statutory language could reflect the state legislature’s
belief that children’s mental health is a subject better left to the family or,
perhaps, to an intimate and private conversation between parents and
their child’s pediatrician.
Although the Utah statute emphasizes three important aspects of
children’s mental health, there is one grave concern with this legislative
191. Gelman, supra note 145, at 244.
192. Id. at 237.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 238 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, GAY, LESBIAN, AND BISEXUAL
ISSUES, available at http://healthyminds.org/More-Info-For/GayLesbianBisexuals.aspx (last visited
July 19, 2009) (acknowledging the Association’s new position on homosexuality)).
195. Gelman, supra note 145, at 237.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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approach: such a narrow approach restricts the school’s ability to communicate with parents about mental health concerns and therefore may
not be in the best interests of the child.199 Because open discussions between parents and teachers regarding a child’s behavior might help persuade a parent that psychological testing is needed, restriction on such
dialogue may further exacerbate the condition.200 The restrictive Utah
law has the potential to create “silent witnesses,” which does not help the
child, the parent, or the state.201 Moreover, restricted communication
may serve to propagate further denial of a child’s mental health problems, and concerns with stigmatization should not remain a barrier to
seeking care.
It is unclear whether the restrictions that Utah places on open and
frank discussions between parents and teachers conflicts with the IDEA
provision, which explicitly allows teachers to raise concerns about mental health issues with parents. While the Utah Code prohibits teachers
from discussing psychological treatment or psychotropic medication with
parents, the federal statute expressly encourages teachers to share with
parents classroom observations or the need for special education and related services. Although further discussion of this topic is beyond the
scope of this Comment, the statute’s mixed messages and uncertainties
likely create confusion for Utah educators.202
Because Washington should adopt a mental health scheme for public schools consistent with the notion of parental rights while also protecting the well-being of mentally ill children, state legislation should
incorporate only certain features of the Utah statute; specifically, a definition of mental health that reflects cultural sensitivity and preservation
of parental rights through notice and active consent.
C. Connecticut: The Moderate Approach
Unlike Illinois’s broad approach or Utah’s narrow approach, Connecticut takes a more moderate position. The Connecticut statute pertaining to children’s mental health focuses on the duties of the Education
Department.203 The duties of the Department are as follows: “(1) [to]
[c]oordinate school-based early detection and prevention programs . . .,
and (2) in conjunction with the Department of Children and Families and
local mental health agencies, [to] provide training [and] consultation . . .
to . . . boards of education in early detection, intervention techniques,
199. Curran, supra note 107, at 142.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 143.
202. Id. at 140.
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76w (1993).
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screening . . . and evaluation.”204 The statute also states that the Department “shall identify specific goals and objectives for the program prior to
the solicitation of applications for participation in such program and shall
define in advance what specific measures it shall employ to measure the
attainment of the goals and objectives.”205
The Connecticut statute creates a school-based early detection and
prevention program under the specific pretext of cooperation with the
Department of Children and Families.206 The statute emphasizes educator training on early detection techniques, including mental health
screenings.207 Because the statute requires each school to identify specific goals and objectives for these programs and to define what measures it shall employ, each public school is held accountable not only for a
thorough review of the purposes for the children’s mental health program
but also for an assessment of the best screening instruments for implementing the primary mental health program.208
The Connecticut statute has four key characteristics: (1) cooperation, (2) training and utilization of educators, (3) a more transparent assessment process focused on accountability, and (4) early detection.
First, because the Connecticut statute explicitly requires that the
Department of Education implement school mental health “detection and
prevention programs . . . in conjunction with the Department of Children
and Families [sic] and local mental health agencies,”209 the Connecticut
legislature has chosen to emphasize cooperation and utilize existing children’s mental health expertise. Naturally, the Department of Children
and Families and local mental health agencies are in a better position
than the Department of Education to recognize the newest, most effective, and culturally appropriate assessment instruments.210 This cooperation between agencies lends itself to more thorough, efficient, and proper
mental health assessment programs.211
Second, like the Illinois statute, the Connecticut statute recognizes
the concept of educators as experts, but it takes this idea one step further
by providing unequivocal language requiring training, consultation, and
assistance212 to educators to help develop and implement successful programs. Because educators stand in a key position for identifying child204. Id. § 10-76w(a).
205. Id. § 10-76w(c).
206. Id. § 10-76w(a)(2).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 10-76w(c).
209. Id. § 10-76w(a)(1)–(2).
210. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 297.
211. Id.
212. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76w(a)(2).
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hood mental illness, this statutorily mandated support will likely lead to
an increase in the detection of students’ mental health issues.213
Third, the Connecticut statute incorporates a natural accountability
mechanism. The Connecticut law requires the Department of Education
to identify specific goals and objectives as part of a school’s application
for participation in the primary mental health program.214 Thus, each
school is held accountable not only for thoroughly contemplating the
curriculum of its program but also for assessing the measures it will employ to ensure a successful program.215 Essentially, each school will
likely strive to identify the most appropriate screening instruments to
guarantee an effective program, which, in turn, will ensure its continued
participation in the primary mental health program. This accountability
serves to enhance the transparency of the assessment process for educators and parents alike. Lastly, the benefits of focusing on early detection,
as discussed above, further support the inherent value of Connecticut’s
moderate approach.216
Fourth, the Connecticut approach favors a cooperative and transparent mental health scheme for public schools. Although the statute
lacks language touching upon parental rights and a specific structure for
schools’ primary mental health programs, the Connecticut approach still
offers a number of admirable qualities such as educator training, school
accountability, and a focus on early detection. Thus, the Connecticut
statute provides a strong basic framework for Washington.
Illinois, Utah, and Connecticut have enacted children’s mental
health statutes across the spectrum, ranging from supportive of school
authority to emphasis on family privacy. The Illinois statute illustrates
the importance of in-school screenings, educator training, and emotional
health curriculum. Utah’s approach demonstrates how legislation can be
respectful of family privacy and sensitive to the meaning of mental
health across cultures. Finally, the Connecticut statute illustrates the importance of a cooperative and transparent approach and emphasizes accountability and early detection. Washington should enact children’s
mental health legislation that reflects an integration of these three positions.
VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR WASHINGTON
In light of the positive and negative characteristics of the Illinois,
Utah, and Connecticut statutes, Washington should adopt a modified ver213. Adelman & Taylor, supra note 12, at 297.
214. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76w(c).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 10-76w(a)(2).
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sion of the moderate approach. Washington should enact a cooperative
and transparent mental health scheme for public schools that includes inschool screenings, informed and active parental consent, educator training, and emotional health curriculum. This Part recommends specific
actions that the Washington legislature should take to enact this cooperative and transparent mental health scheme.
To capture the most benefits of the state approaches mentioned
above and to adequately address the concerns, Washington should implement legislation that revolves around four themes: (1) a commitment
to preserving open parent–teacher communication and dispelling stigma;
(2) an informed and active parental consent process combined with annual mental health screenings; (3) a cooperative framework with emphasis on utilizing mental health experts, training educators, and integrating
social and development curriculum into the school system; and (4) a dedication to the overarching goal of furthering the best interests of each
and every child.
First, as opposed to the restrictions placed on teacher–parent communication in the Utah statute, Washington should embrace an open door
policy that encourages communication between all involved parties.
Simply put, perpetuating the secrecy and stigma associated with mental
illness does not aid in the diagnosis or treatment of children with mental
health issues. Both the IDEA217 and the New Freedom Commission218
support destigmatizing mental illness in the United States. While teachers should respect family privacy, especially considering the sensitive
nature of mental health, they should also feel free to work together with
parents to help address the issues at hand and to improve students’ emotional health. Open communication between students, parents, teachers,
administrators, and mental health professionals is essential to ameliorating the U.S.’s children’s mental health crisis.
Second, the Washington legislature should incorporate an informed
and active parental consent process and implement annual mental health
screenings. Perhaps the greatest concern with the public school system
administering mental health screenings is the infringement on the fundamental right to parent. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has
not provided a bright-line rule as to when constitutional school action
ends and infringement on the fundamental right to parent begins.219
217. See supra Part III.C. Because teachers were concerned about potential barriers to communication with parents regarding a child’s behavior or mental health, lawmakers included a provision explicitly allowing teachers to share classroom-based observations with parents regarding a
student’s behavior in the classroom.
218. See supra Part III.A.
219. See supra Part IV.A.
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However, as evidenced by district and circuit court decisions, the most
important factors to consider in deciding whether the screening is constitutional are the nature of the administration of the survey, the notice,
consent, or opt-out procedures, and the effect of the survey on the parent–child relationship.220 Because mental health screenings are important, resourceful, and evidence-based early detection tools, Washington
must find a way to balance these interests. Washington should encourage public schools to provide voluntary annual mental health screenings
to children, predicated on obtaining explicit, informed, and active consent. Although informed and active consent is more cumbersome than an
opt-out procedure, this safety measure ensures that mental health screenings distributed by schools will not infringe on the fundamental right to
parent.
Third, Washington should implement legislation that adopts a cooperative framework that utilizes mental health expertise, trains educators, and integrates social and development standards into school curricula. Crafted after the Connecticut statute, which stressed educator training, school accountability, and cooperation,221 such an approach would
boost the comprehensiveness of detection, teacher knowledge, and
school accountability. Moreover, by employing local mental health experts to develop and implement the screenings and mental health programs, those concerned with the validity of the instruments or lack of
cultural sensitivity may be put more at ease.
Finally, the intent of the Washington statute should stress the state’s
dedication to furthering the best interests of the child. The Illinois statute, in particular, did an excellent job conveying this concept by underscoring the benefits of ensuring the healthy social and emotional development of children.222 In deciding the most beneficial children’s mental
health scheme for Washington, the balance between protecting parental
rights and granting schools the authority to help detect mental illness
must always be viewed in light of the best interests of the child.
In sum, Washington should adopt a cooperative and transparent
mental health scheme for public schools that includes in-school screening, informed and active parental consent, educator training, and emotional health curriculum. Such legislation should focus on preserving
parent–teacher communication, fostering an explicit parental consent
process, involving the mental health community, and spotlighting the
best interests of the child. This approach is consonant with the notion of

220. See supra Part IV.B.
221. See supra Part V.C.
222. See supra Part V.A.
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parental rights, while protecting the well-being of Washington’s mentally
ill children.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because it is estimated that ten percent of children in the United
States suffer from some form of mental illness223 and because this nation
has experienced tragedies such as Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Northern Illinois University (which were later attributed to undetected mental
illness),224 children’s mental health is an issue of great importance.
Although federal legislation does not specifically require public
schools to administer mental health screening instruments, it advocates
for early detection, parental consent, and open communication. Moreover, while Supreme Court jurisprudence does not consider the fundamental right to parent an absolute or qualified right, subsequent lower
court decisions provide some clarity by reciting factors that might affect
the constitutionality of mental health screenings.225
States have taken drastically different approaches to children’s
mental health legislation. Whereas Illinois embraces a broad focus on
comprehensive children’s mental health law reform, Utah applies a narrower approach that limits parent–teacher communication regarding students’ mental health. Connecticut, on the other hand, adopts more moderate legislation tailored toward cooperative and transparent mental
health programs in public schools.
Taking into consideration the various elements of these state statutes, the Washington legislature should enact children’s mental health
legislation that encourages open parent–teacher communication, requires
explicit notice and active parental consent for in-school mental health
screenings, fosters cooperation with the mental health community, and
focuses on the best interests of the child. Hopefully, Washington will
choose to participate in the national dialogue on children’s mental health
and will aspire to enact thoughtful and comprehensive mental health legislation specifically aimed at utilizing its public education system.

223. See supra Part II.
224. See supra Part I.
225. See supra Part IV.

